Second, the U.S.S.R. can withdraw from the treaty with 90 day's notice and start atmospheric testing. The extensive series with which the U.S.S.R. broke the previous moratorium required 2 years' secret preparation. Thereby the U.S.S.R. gained 2 years' time in the development of nuclear weapons. We need to know the cost and feasibility of maintaining a 90-day readiness of an atmospheric test series in order to forestall more such gains.

Third, the U.S.S.R. could test clandestinely, a possibility open to the United States only under wartime conditions. Experts at Geneva agreed that a determined nation could secretly test a half megaton in space. Surveillance of atmospheric tests is not reliable below a certain yield and that limit may be raised by "clean" explosives. Can the U.S.S.R. develop a successful ballistic missile defense by clandestine testing? What potentialities in our ability to penetrate U.S.S.R. defenses and we denied by treaty prohibitions? What potentialities for our own defense and the protection of ICBM sites are we denied? The nuclear shield of the free world hinges on the answer to these questions.

Fourth, underground explosions are prohibited if radioactive debris falls outside national territory. Most ploughshare harbors and canals entail minor contamination of international waters and will be prohibited. Underground testing might be limited in a crippling way depending on a quantitative definition of "radioactive debris" nowhere stated. Of equal importance to treaty limitations is the support that will be given to the underground program. We learned in the last moratorium that the pace of nuclear weapon development is set by the pace of the experimental test program. Our ability under the treaty to maintain our nuclear arms relative to the U.S.S.R. depends on the vigor of the underground program.

These are important military and technical issues raised by the treaty. There are additional political issues, such as the effect of the treaty on he NATO alliance, that need discussion. When sober consideration has been given to these issues of national security, and only then, can we see if ratification of the treaty is a step toward an honorable peace or toward submission to U.S.S.R. domination.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE CONGRESS

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Sunday New York Times magazine of yesterday, September 15, 1963, carries an important, thoughtfully written article by Mr. Fred Dutton entitled "The Cold War Between the Hill and Foggy Bottom."

The article centers on the problems and tensions which inevitably arise in the relations between the Congress and the State Department in the field of foreign policy.

Mr. Dutton is admirably qualified to discuss this vital sector of American public life. He is currently Assistant Secretary of State—a responsibility which he discharges with rare skill and intelligence. Mr. Dutton was previously a Special Assistant to President Kennedy—a position which gave him a keen understanding of the overall problems and responsibilities of the executive branch of our Government. Prior to his service in Washington, Fred Dutton established an enviable record as an adviser and assistant to Governor Brown of California.

It has been my privilege to observe Fred Dutton's service while we were both employed in the Executive Office of the President and since he has assumed his present important task in the State Department, I think he is a brilliant and highly able public official and a dedicated, ideally motivated citizen.

His article on the difficult problems of foreign policy as they relate to Congress and the State Department is well worth reading by the Members of Congress. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COLD WAR BETWEEN THE HILL AND FOGGY BOTTOM

(By Frederick G. Dutton)

WASHINGTON.—Whatever the shifting outlook in the rest of the world, one area of chronic tension and even occasional guerrilla warfare is the 2-mile gap in Washington between the Hill and Foggy Bottom—between Congress and the State Department.

In the gamut of American Government probably no greater antagonism has been generated over the years than that between the legislative branch and the Nation's foreign policy apparatus. The wrangling could be dismissed as just more governmental infighting if it did not involve some of the most critical and complex issues facing this country.

The view from Capitol Hill is reflected in almost any daily issue of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Thus, on one typical day this year: An Ohio Congressman called for "a thorough fumigation of the State Department"; a Mississippi Senator held forth on an investigation of present Cuban policies; a New Jersey Representative charged this country's role in the Congo was "a sorry mess"; a Wyoming Senator claimed he saw indications of a secret agreement with Khrushchev; and a California Representative claimed that during 5 years of negotiation the United States "has been steadily losing its nuclear shirt." Over a dozen others spoke out with counsel or criticism aimed at the State Department.

The view of the legislative branch among many foreign affairs specialists, on the other hand, was summed up years ago in Henry Adams' comment: "The Secretary of State exists only to recognize the existence of a world which Congress would rather ignore." Or, as a Secretary of State once wrote, "We are so handicapped by the Senate and House that there is nothing more to do but follow a policy of makeshifts and half measures."

With such sharply contrasting attitudes between the Hill and Foggy Bottom, it is little wonder that misunderstandings and even occasional conflicts break out. "The miracle of the day," Secretary Rusk has observed, "is that we have moved in concert as well as we have."

As with nations, much of the real cause of the trouble has long since been obscured by semantics and stereotypes injected into problems in which they are irrelevant and invoked mostly to vent frustrations. Thus congressional complaints about world affairs are often dismissed by foreign-policy experts—in the press as well as in Government—as "uninformed," "opportunist," and "special interest motivated." The State Department is recurrently assailed as "weak kneed," "the victim of a plot," "the dupe of foreigners," and with other more lurid charges as old as politics.

So far neither side has given much recognition to the possibility that the other may be only trying to meet its functional responsibility—Congress to represent the diverse views and interests that make up our national society; the State Department to see that the hard complex facts and alternatives of policy concerning the rest of the world are fully considered in the ultimate decisions of the Government.

Increasingly, the main business of Washington is to reconcile this country's domestic and international interests. Since the relationship between Congress and the State Department is intimately involved in that business, there is serious need to dispel the encumbering nonsense.

The difficulties between the legislative branch and foreign-policy apparatus stem primarily from the fact that they are sharply different creatures. The State Department is analytical, tentative and cumbersome as it digests vast detail from far sources and cautiously gropes for the real meaning of what is happening in the world. A friendly but exasperated Senator recently described State as "rational, maybe, iffy at best." Its recommendations often recognize that only part of a problem can be influenced, and decisions are sometimes deliberately left implicit.

Congress, regularly faced with reelection, is assertive, often glandular, in its approach to the world. If one views the untidy legislative process of interrogation and advocacy as an effort to reach a consensus rather than as executive decisionmaking and recognizes that Congress can really affect the President's hold on foreign affairs only if wide support is enlisted, then what sometimes seems erratic or even perverse behavior may actually contain a creativeness, vigor and incisiveness often undernourished in the foreign-policy apparatus.

In addition to the inherent differences, international developments since World War II—including farflung security demands and the growing interdependence of the world—have widened and complicated contacts between the two, making a tolerable accommodation between them vastly more difficult.

More directly, the legislative branch has been injected into broad and continuing international policies through its control of the purse strings. Global efforts since World War II have relied on larger and larger appropriations for economic assistance, for military support and even for the State Department itself.

The principal foreign-policy legislation before the current session of Congress, the foreign-aid bill, highlights the tugging and hauling going on between the executive and legislative branches over their respective influence—a struggle between the constitutional authority over foreign affairs and that over appropriations—where this country's relations with the rest of the globe are concerned.

On immediate life-and-death decisions, the Chief Executive unquestionably holds the initiative. In circumstances such as the Cuban crisis last October and the Korean action in 1950, the President can and did determine the Nation's course without having to consult with Congress in advance of his decision.

But in the longer-range programs through which the United States can most consistently influence rather than just react to world developments, the two branches of Government still seem too often to be wrestling for control. Recent comments by Malcolm Moos, Richard Neustadt, and others about "the shift of great decisions to the executive offices and out of the parliamentary chamber" really apply more to pushbutton than long-haul problems.

The extent to which legislators court positive influence is reflected not only in their recurring forays into the Cuban problem, but also in the influential role Congress has played in this country's China policy for the last decade and a half.

The limits of legislative and executive reach in this field are indicated in Senator Fulbright's comment that "Congress has neither the authority nor the means to conduct American foreign policy, but it has ample power to implement, modify or thwart executive proposals."

The increasing attention of the legislative branch to international affairs is reflected quantitatively in the growing volume of congressional correspondence with the State Department. Thus, the number of letters from Senators and Congressmen on policy questions (wholly apart from passport inquiries and similar matters) has risen from about 7,600 in 1958 to 11,200 in 1960, to 18,600 in 1962. The trend this year indicates the volume will reach at least 23,000.

Likewise, the range of congressional committees taking up matters involving the State Department has steadily expanded beyond the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. The number of formal appearances by the Secretary of State before congressional committees now ranges between 25 to 35 a year. Last year, hearings involving other State Department officials rose to an alltime high—over 220. The volume of informal briefings and other congressional contacts with foreign policy experts is also growing.

Potentially, the development that could most significantly affect relations between the Hill and Foggy Bottom is not direct governmental activities but the rapid internationalizing of American politics. Not only presidential but congressional campaigns are focusing more and more on events abroad and this country's part in them.

While individual Senators and Congressmen struggle in their own behalf for a few inches of press coverage or 30 seconds of TV or radio exposure, their constituents are constantly bombarded with what is happening in the world and, by implication, how Americans should be concerned about it. Where public attention thus leads, elected officials are usually not far behind.

At the poll-taking level, Gallup has reported for years that the overriding preoccupation of most voters is the international situation. In last year's congressional campaign, for example, even before the Cuban crisis, he found that 55 percent of those surveyed considered war, peace, and international tensions to be the issues of greatest concern.

Far behind were the 11 percent reported to be most disturbed by the high cost of living and taxes, the seven percent most deeply concerned by unemployment, and the six percent then most alarmed by racial problems.

In 1962, one of the country's most durable political figures, Senator EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, of Illinois, was reported by the press to have "opened his campaign for reelection last week with the loud pedal down on the theme that his role as Senate minority leader has armed him with a deep knowledge of foreign affairs. * * * He spoke of trips he had made to see foreign countries at first hand. He asserted that Laos was 'the corridor to control of all of the Far East,' and said that if Laos fell to the Communists, so in time would Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines."

Although many in the Capitol still look at foreign policy as though it were an alien plague and contend that post offices and other Federal projects remain their districts' abiding interest, newspaper reports on President Kennedy's trip to South Dakota last summer to dedicate the Oahe Dam are worth noting. They observed that the biggest crowd response came not when he referred to what the project would do for the prairie country along the Missouri River, but when he referred to far larger Russian exploits and said he did not want to see the United States second to the Soviets in space, hydroelectric projects or anything else.

All these developments suggest that Members of Congress will concern themselves more and more with the international scene. In view of this, it is essential not only that any partisan differences over foreign policy be moderated, but that executive-legislative frictions be eased as well.

For better or worse and notwithstanding the recent suggestion by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the President be given significantly enhanced authority over international affairs, no organic change is likely to come soon in the present separation and sharing of the principal governmental powers affecting foreign policy. The existing machinery is going to have to be made to work, however much it sometimes grates.

Thus, both sides need to face up to several hard facts.

First, many in the State Department must learn to accept that Congress has entered into the world as never before, and is there to stay. At the same time, many in Congress must recognize that explosive international problems cannot be handled with the sensationalism or certainty with which politics back home are sometimes treated. Neither can the Foreign Service be used as a favorite political punching bag without impairing its effectiveness.

In addition, substantially more and better contacts are needed between these two distinct, sometimes remote, groups if the underlying attitudes and semantics that breed much of the difficulty are to be straightened out.

In the last year a number of steps have been taken to narrow the gap between the two sides. The results thus far are mixed at best.

For Congressmen, weekly off-the-record briefings are now held by key State Department officials. (Usually only several dozen out of 435 Members have time, or are interested enough, to attend. Some who stay away claim they don't get the unequivocal answers they want.)

A substantially increased number of background papers and special studies of current problems are now sent regularly to congressional offices. ("A snow job," some members snort.) And special question-and-answer sessions have been organized for the administrative assistants to Senators and Congressmen. ("Pure propaganda," the Department's critics complain.)

Missionary work for Congress inside the State Department includes a number of innovations. Thus, three Members of the Senate discussed Congressional criticism of the Foreign Service with over 800 career officers in a closed-door session last summer. And a daily summary of foreign-policy comments in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD is distributed throughout the department and to posts abroad.

The training of junior Foreign Service officers now includes a 2-week apprenticeship in a congressional office. And all career officers going to or returning from overseas are being urged not only to go and see their Congressmen but to go home and see the people there instead of just coming back to Washington while on leave in this country.

Far more is needed, however, than attention to underlying attitudes. The channels for substantive communication need to be improved so that the insistent critical faculty of Congress can be focused better, and the executive branch can have broader impact in making its case on the Hill. Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY'S proposal that the Secretary of State should regularly be invited for a question period period before the full membership of each House is not new. But it recognizes the major communications problem that must be solved.

Even with improvements, however, it has to be recognized that the difficulties between Congress and the State Department will never disappear completely. The basic differences between the two make a considerable amount of contention inevitable.

As is so often the case with foreign policy perhaps the best that can be asked is that the frictions be kept within reasonable limits—and that will have to be worked out day by day, problem by problem, in the way the world's troubles must be attended to.

Finally, the interplay between Congress and the foreign-policy apparatus cannot be looked at alone but must be considered as part of the far broader question that Walter Lippmann raised at the start of this year: "How can democratic government, which was conceived and established in a very different era from this one, be made fit for the crises and the tempo and the conflicts of the present age?"

This is not just a question of constitutional arrangement, but of the capacity of the American people to relate themselves perceptively and with discretion to the rest of the world.

The personal and immediate way that many in Congress look at this problem was summed up recently for a group of Foreign Service officers by one of the younger Members of the House: "The question is not will Congress be responsible on international issues—but can we be, and get away with it?"

The remark reflects in a very practical way that the relationship between Congress and the State Department is not just a matter of whether two key parts of Government are working together with reasonable effectiveness. In the final anaysis, it is a question of how well the domestic and international attitudes and interests of American society are reconciled and brought to bear on the many tasks and opportunities that face us.

MEXICAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

Mr. HART. Mr. President, the 16th of September is traditionally celebrated by our Mexican brothers as Independence Day. Once again this year, joyful celebrations will commemorate the heroic struggle of the Mexican people for independence and mastery of their destiny. For 10 years, the Mexican people fought foreign domination armed with little more than their courage, fortitude and determination. But their victory was worth it: freedom and independence.

Today Mexico is indeed free, independent—a democratic nation rapidly progressing to achieve economic justice for all her citizens, to make available education and opportunity to the most remote village and to achieve a modern technology amid her rich ancient culture.

We have in our country many thousands of citizens of Mexican background. Certainly we in Michigan are proud and strengthened by the presence of many substantial citizens whose heritage is Mexican. These industrious citizens have enriched American life with their language, music and colorful customs. On the anniversary of Mexican independence, our American citizens of Mexican cultural heritage take pride in the achievements of their forefathers.

Mr. President, on this occasion, I am proud to extend my very good wishes to our Mexican friends south of the border and to join with all American citizens of Mexican background in celebrating this joyful day.

BOTTOM

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